Two for-profit Philippine banks, aiming to demonstrate corporate social responsibility ("CSR") by increasing microlending to the poor, incorporated a widely used poverty measurement tool into their loan applications and tested the tool using randomized training content. Treated loan officers were instructed why and how to use the tool for targeting; control group training merely labeled the tool "additional household information." The targeting training backfired, leading to no additional poor applicants and potentially lower-performing loans. Descriptive evidence suggests the targeting training exacerbated loan officer misperceptions and multitasking problems. This cautionary tale is an example of why firms may want to silo CSR efforts from core operations.
used for underwriting, in its new loan application management and credit scoring software. The research team trained all 27 loan officers that worked in microlending in 20 branches to use the new software. Of the 20 branches, 10 were randomly assigned to treatment and 10 to control. Loan officers in treatment branches were informed that the new questions should be used to improve identification of poor households, reassured that the poverty indicators were not linked to credit risk or the assessment thereof, and reminded of the bank's social mission to reach poor households. 4 Loan officers in control branches were informed simply that the 10 new questions were "additional household information."
We implemented the poverty targeting tool with the intention of making it easier for loan officers to identify poor households and encourage them to apply. 5 The treatment group training made this objective prominent and tied it explicitly to the banks' social missions. Beyond the introduction of the tool and senior management's exhortation and expectations, loan officers faced no additional inducements to bring in poor households. Nonetheless, the exhortations and expectations by senior management were sincere: the plan was for the training to increase lending to the poor and then to use that exogenous increase to study the impact of the banks' microlending on poverty alleviation.
Loan officers also faced standard incentives to maximize the traditional bottom line in the form of performance pay based on number of loans originated and the timeliness of loan repayments. In this sense we expected the poverty targeting tool to alleviate a classic multi-tasking problem where loan officers faced relatively strong incentives to maximize profits, potentially at the expense of bringing in more poor clients.
Treatment effects of the poverty targeting tool, estimated on outcomes measured over a twoyear horizon, suggest that it backfired. On the social side of the bottom line, the tool failed to increase lending to the poor: treated loan officers brought in weakly more applicants (12 additional applicants, 22% more than control, p-value=0.40), but the total number of poor applicants remained low, averaging just one applicant per loan officer (out of 65 applications). At the same 4 Explaining the significance of a task has been shown to improve performance of that task for employees in different contexts (e.g., Grant 2008; DellaVigna and Pope 2018) . 5 Ashraf and Bandiera (2018) reviews the literature on the importance of social incentives in organizations, including "vertical social groups," where employees can be motivated by improving the lives of those they serve.
time the applicants brought in by the treatment group were objectively richer than those in the control, with higher monthly incomes and more total assets (0.36 & 0.54 log-points, p-value=0.001 in both cases). On the traditional side of the bottom line, there is suggestive evidence that the intervention failed to hold profits constant: loans brought in by treatment group officers have weakly higher default rates (3.4 pp, p-value=0.10), while loan size and other terms do not change.
An increase in default rates is bad not just for the banks but also for the individual loan officers since higher default rates can lead to reprimands and missed incentive bonuses.
Surprised by these results, two years after the experimental period we worked with the banks to administer a survey of all bank loan officers (not just those who cover microcredit; N=68) to explore their beliefs and attitudes. We use these surveys to explore mechanisms, specifically employee attitudes and beliefs, with one strong note of caution: these credit officer surveys were conducted after the experimental period and on all loan officers, not just the ones that cover microcredit loans. 6 We observe two important insights from the employee survey. First, loan officers view the profit-making side of their job as more important than the social welfare side.
Second, loan officers perceive poorer borrowers to be less profitable, despite bank management exhortations and empirical evidence to the contrary.
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Taking the experimental and descriptive results together, we speculate that treatment group loan officers were trying to act like canonical multi-taskers: maximize profits without making any additional effort to bring in more poor borrowers. 8 But-still speculating (after all, we only have two banks and 27 loan officers, thus null effects are not precisely estimated)-treated loan officers mistakenly thought that the new poverty targeting tool was helping them do a better job of bringing in profitable borrowers by screening out poor credit risks. Perhaps this was a salience-driven overreaction (Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer 2019); after all, all loan officers in the experiment had access to the tool, with the treatment merely drawing attention to it and to the banks' social 6 Too few loan officers from the experimental period were still employed at the time of the survey to focus the analysis on them. 7 In this sense our study adds to the literatures on biases in expert judgment (e.g., Soll, Milkman and Payne 2015) on the economics of discrimination in product markets and credit markets in particular (e.g., Blanchflower, Levine, and Zimmerman 2003; Hanson et al. 2016) , and on the importance of the motivation of front-line employees (e.g., Ashraf, Bandiera, and Lee 2016). 8 Note that "maximizing profits" could instead be "maximizing utility" and thus incorporate the possibility that the treatment reduces employees' intrinsic motivation or changes their effort costs.
objective. Another possibility is that treatment group default rates rose because of a monitoring failure: perhaps loan officers failed to anticipate the challenges of managing more borrowers.
Our study contributes to the above-cited literatures on multi-tasking, poverty targeting, social enterprise, and social incentives in businesses. In particular, our findings speak to how social incentives and financial incentives can interact and affect organizational performance. While other studies have shown that financial incentives can help mitigate the tendency to favor "in-group" members (e.g. Ashraf and Bandiera (2018), Bandiera et al. (2009)), our context shows how financial incentives can instead exacerbate this tendency when performance is hard to predict and social and financial incentives are perceived to be misaligned. Giné, Mansuri, and Shrestha (2018) find that providing financial incentives to the front-line staff of a nonprofit microlender leads to negative social impacts on clients, and our results compliment this line of inquiry by demonstrating how even non-financial incentives can backfire in a setting with a double bottom line.
We also contribute to work on CSR, by adding insights on the production of CSR to a literature 
II. Setting
We developed and conducted the poverty targeting experiment in close cooperation with the senior management and microlending operations of two longstanding, family-owned-and- Poverty targeting itself is a non-trivial task. In wealthier countries the poor are often identified using measures of formal income, but in developing countries the poor tend to work in the informal economy, making income measurement difficult. Organizations use a variety of different targeting methods to address this challenge (Hanna and Karlan 2017).
Our loan officers thus face a difficult problem: they have front-line responsibility for both sides of the bottom line but face quantitative incentives and directives only on the traditional side. There may well be tension between maximizing profits and bringing in more poor clients. If poor clients are worse credit risks, or are perceived to be worse by officers, they could jeopardize loan officers' incentive pay. And if poor clients are difficult to identify-if it is difficult to measure whether a given borrower actually contributes to the bank's objective of expanding lending to the poorthen finding poor borrowers could leave less time for other screening and monitoring activities that are key inputs to the traditional bottom line.
The intervention was designed to alleviate tension in the loan officers' juggling act by making it easier to identify poor applicants, signaling the importance of bringing in more poor clients, and clarifying the bank management's belief that credit risk and poverty status are uncorrelated, conditional on the other applicant characteristics considered in underwriting.
III. Experimental Design
Management at both banks sought to make it easier and more salient for loan officers to bring in more poor applicants. To this end the banks worked with us to design and implement a simple experiment on poverty targeting training. In March 2010 we randomized the population of loan officers from the two banks (NL=27), pairwise at the branch level (NB=20), to one of two groups:
Treatment and Control. 11 The randomization produces twelve treated and fifteen control loan officers, from ten treatment and ten control branches. Table 1 Panel A shows that we cannot reject equality of means for treatment and control branches across the few branch characteristics for which we have data at baseline: poverty headcount in the branch's catchment area, total number of loan officers (including those not included in the experiment because they are not responsible for microloans), and year opened. Panel B shows no evidence of differential loan officer attrition across the two arms. The null effects in Table 1 -and below when we estimate treatment effectsare subject to the important caveat that they are imprecisely estimated.
Both treatment and control groups used the same loan application process. Specifically, the start of our experiment coincided with the banks changing from paper applications and manual underwriting to electronic and more-automated underwriting. We embedded the Poverty Probability Index (PPI) into the new electronic application. 12 The PPI is comprised of ten simple, country-specific questions used to calculate a poverty likelihood (the Appendix details the questions and scoring for the Philippines).
The treatment was simple. As part of the training on the new system, treated loan officers received: 1) Explanation that the purpose of the ten questions was to make it easier to identify and service poor applicants (training for the control loan officers simply referred to these questions as "additional household information); 2) Exhortation tying the PPI to the organization's social mission of helping the poor by providing them access to microfinance (the control loan officers received no such exhortation), 3) Reassurance that, taking into account the other information required of applicants and thus conditioning on being approved for a loan, poverty status does not impact credit risk. Hence management asserted to credit officers that bringing in more poor borrowers would not affect loan officers' ability to meet their incentive targets for loan performance (the control loan officers received no such reassurance).
IV. Results
We estimate treatment effects of the poverty targeting training on loan officer behavior by regressing an outcome , pertinent to the traditional or social side of the banks' bottom lines and measured over the 24-months post-random assignment, on a treatment group indicator and our randomization strata (i.e., our branch-pair fixed effects):
= * + � * + i indexes loan officers, loan applicants, or loans, depending on the outcome. We always cluster standard errors at the level of randomization: the bank branch. Because we have a small number of branches (20), we use randomization inference to generate our p-values with 5,000 permutations 12 The PPI was developed by the Grameen Foundation in 2006 and is now used by organizations in 45 countries. The Philippines index was based on data from the Philippines' Annual Poverty Indicators Survey (APIS). In 2016, Grameen transferred management of the index to Innovations for Poverty Action (IPA), which then changed the PPI name from the Progress out of Poverty Index to the Poverty Probability Index. The new name was chosen to reflect the static nature of the index, i.e., the index estimates the likelihood of being below the poverty line at a particular point in time, and does not estimate or predict changes over time. (Young 2018; Heb 2017) . On the other hand, Panel C shows that loan officers use the PPI training to select richer applicants, with variables collected for underwriting purposes but not included in the PPI index indicating higher-income and higher-wealth applicants. Monthly income is 36% higher, total assets are 54% higher, the number of businesses per applicant is 9% higher (all three of those estimates have p-values=0.00), and homeownership is 8% higher (p-value=0.03) .
14 The apparent contradiction that Panel C's strong increase in wealth is not reflected in a strong decrease in poverty likelihood in Panels A or B is resolved by noting that the PPI tool is calibrated to assess poverty likelihood changes at lower levels of income and wealth than the great majority of applicants in our sample. Figure 1 plots the distribution of PPI scores against poverty likelihood in a nationally representative sample. 15 It shows that our sample is relatively rich, with our treatment and control distributions lying mostly in the flat part of the score-likelihood gradient.
Thus the failure of our intervention to bring in more poor applicants produces, mechanically, an 13 Appendix Table 1 reports treatment effects on each of the 10 components of the PPI. 14 Appendix Table 2 shows a similar pattern of results if we consider only approved applications in Panels A-C instead of all applications. 15 We generate the national distribution using data from the 2008 Annual Poverty Indicator Survey. attenuation of the relationship between the PPI score and poverty likelihood. By construction, the score is not meant to be predictive for those with a very low poverty likelihood.
Comparing treatment vs. control, we find that the distributions are significantly different from each other (p-value=0.035 from a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test) with a treatment effect on rightskewness that is consistent with the higher wealth found in Table 1 Panel C.
Turning to the traditional side of the bottom line, we note that while treated loan officers bring in weakly more applicants (Panel A) and approved loans (Appendix Table 2 Panel A), an increase in loan volume will increase profitability only if there are fixed costs (which is a fair assumption), loan terms do not become less favorable to the bank, and loan performance does not deteriorate. Table 2 Panel D suggests that loan performance does deteriorate: the most important measure of portfolio-at-risk (based on the actual performance incentives of loan officers), loan default, increases by 3.4pp (p-value=0.10, control group proportion=0.122) on loans originated by treated loan officers. A reduction in loan performance of this magnitude would almost certainly prevent a loan officer from earning a performance bonus, as bonuses are forfeited if portfolio-atrisk is above 5%.
The increase in default may be (partially) explained by the 9pp increase (p-value=0.00) in loan take-up conditional on application approval (Panel D). This is an additional indication that the treatment induced loan officers to change their screening and targeting activities in unintended ways. We explore how and why in the next section.
All told, the results in Table 2 suggest that the poverty targeting treatment caused loan officers to miss both social impact and profitability targets.
V. Exploring Mechanisms through an Ex-Post Loan Officer Survey
Bank management and we were surprised by the results in Table 2 . To explore how loan officer attitudes and beliefs might moderate and/or drive the results, we fielded a survey approximately two years after the conclusion of our study period (i.e., approximately four years after starting the experiment). Neither bank had made changes to its loan application or scoring system in the interim, with new loan officers using the PPI questions as "additional household information" with no additional training, a la our Control Group. Research team staff interviewed the 17 of the 27 loan officers who were part of our experiment and still with their original bank, as well as 51 other loan officers from other parts of the banks. Below we report results for all 68 loan officers, and do not focus primarily on the subsample of loan officers remaining from our experiment, given the high attrition rate and small remaining sample size for that sub-sample. Paid" or "Job Security." Similarly, when asked to "Name 3 things that you like most about working at this company," 65% choose "Salary" and 100% named at least one reason related to private returns, while only 21% choose "I feel I can really help people." In the same vein, when asked "Do you think your job is more like…?", 75% choose "Bank work," while only 9% choose "NGO work" and 16% choose "Both." The response patterns in this table suggest that loan officers see themselves as bankers first and foremost. Among the 17 loan officers remaining from our experiment, the slant towards the traditional bottom line seems, if anything, more pronounced (compare Columns 2 and 3 to Column 1). Table 4 sheds some light on how loan officers map an applicant's poverty status onto each side of the double bottom line. The survey asks, for each of the ten PPI component questions, "If you learn the following about a borrower how will it change your opinion of the impact a loan would have on…?" (1) "Profitability for the bank" and (2) "Social welfare for the borrower's family".
We code "More" responses as 1, "Equal" as zero, and, and "Less" as -1.
Column (1) suggests that loan officers perceive the three poverty indicators (many children, light wall and roof materials) as being negatively correlated with profitability. Conversely, most of the seven wealth indicators are thought to be positively correlated with profitability. Averaging the ten responses per loan officer into a single index, after multiplying wealth indicator responses by -1 so that lower values indicate more poverty in each of the ten variables, we infer that on the whole loan officers perceive a negative relationship between profitability and poverty: -0.110 (p-value=0.000). Appendix Table 3 takes this hypothesis to data on loan performance and borrower characteristics and finds no evidence to support it, either unconditionally or conditional on credit score. It seems that loan officers have incorrect perceptions. Table 4 Column (2) In sum, Table 4 suggests that the banks' loan officers tend to think that bringing in more poor borrowers hurts profitability and does not improve social welfare. This suggests an explanation for the failure of our targeting intervention: 1) treated loan officers shared these perceptions during our study despite management reassurances and exhortations to the contrary; 2) treated loan officers tried to use the PPI as a credit risk screening tool instead of a poverty targeting tool; 3) this (mis)use of the PPI backfired, because it led loan officers to bring in applicants that actually had greater ex-ante risk (a screening failure), and/or because it led loan officers to take on larger portfolios that proved unexpectedly difficult to manage (a monitoring failure).
VI. Conclusion
We worked with two for-profit microfinance institutions in the Philippines to implement and test a widely used poverty targeting tool (the Poverty Probability Index), with the objective of providing more loans to poor households. The PPI consists of ten simple questions and was integrated into the standard loan application at each institution. Loan officer training at control group branches (N=10) simply referred to the tool as "additional household information." Training at treatment group branches (N=10) featured explanation of the questions; exhortation to use them to meet the banks' social missions by bringing in more poor borrowers; and reassurance from management that poverty status and loan performance are uncorrelated, conditional on other applicant characteristics.
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The treatment group training backfired: it produced no improvement on the social side of the bottom line (bringing in no more poor applicants or borrowers), while possibly harming the traditional side of the bottom line (our point estimate suggests that loan performance deteriorated substantially). Descriptive evidence suggests that the additional training exacerbated loan officer misperceptions and multitasking problems, with loan officers trying and failing to use the poverty measurement tool in pursuit of profit rather than social objectives.
Some important caveats are worth emphasizing. From an internal validity perspective, our results are underpowered, and the mechanisms we identify are merely suggestive. The point estimates are surprising given the intent of the changed policy, and therefore replication is especially important. From an external validity perspective, our results do not imply that PPI is an ineffective targeting tool in general. The PPI may well be effective in the context of a program whose main purpose is reaching and helping the poor. And our results do not imply that doublebottom line efforts will always backfire; it is important to keep in mind that our partner banks, despite their stated social impact goals and training of staff to reach the poor, provided financial incentives (and perhaps selected personnel) for the traditional bottom line.
Nonetheless our findings suggest that caution is warranted when entrusting employees to balance two bottom lines. Our results also provide an explanation for why many firms take the balancing act out of front-line employees' hands, by segregating corporate social responsibility (CSR) functions from core activities. But separating CSR from core functions may not be optimal in many companies-and perhaps in social enterprises especially.
Hence future work would do well to unpack whether and how front-line employees can successfully juggle both sides of a double-bottom line (or, more broadly, multiple margins of a multi-tasking problem). Complementary approaches to the methods used in this study include testing different incentive mechanisms, training content, employee recruitment strategies, and/or feedback and workflow management tools; better-timed surveys on employee attitudes and perceptions; and more granular measurement of employee activities. There is much more to learn about the challenges and opportunities of implementing a double-bottom line. {0.846} We use pairwise randomization due to the small number of branches (12 at FICO Bank, 8 at First Macro Bank), matching each branch with another branch from the same bank based on the poverty headcount ratio, and then randomizing within each branch pair. P-values in brackets are adjusted for our small number of clusters by using randomization inference with 5,000 permutations per Heb (2017). Poverty ratio is the proportion of households in the branch's catchement area below the 30th percentile of per capita household income, measured using the Annual Poverty Indicators Survey (2004) from the Philippines' National Statistics Office. That survey did not cover the areas served by four FMB branches, and so we matched those four into two pairs based on geographic proximity. Each row reports regression-adjusted means (columns 1 and 2), and the treatment effect (column 3) estimated by regressing the outcome on the treatment indicator and strata (branch-pair) fixed effects. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the branch level and p-values {in brackets} are adjusted for our small number of clusters by using randomization inference with 5,000 permutations per Heb (2017). Panel C variables are collected routinely on loan applications, just like the PPI variables used to construct the poverty indices in Panel B. We characterize individuals as high likelihood of poverty if their PPI score is 39 or lower (see the Appendix for details on index and its construction). Sample size drops from Panels B and C to Panel D because some approved applicants do not avail a loan. Besides loan amount, we do not report other loan terms (e.g., interest rate, maturity) because bank policies allow for little to no variation in those terms. Exchange rate during study period was 45 pesos ≈ 1 USD. Sample:
Loan officers in our experiment
Data are from survey administered 4 years post-random assignment, to all loan officers working for the two banks at the time, not just microloan officers. 17 of the 27 loan officers included in our experiment (see Tables 1 and 2) were still working for the banks at the time of this survey and hence are included in this sample. Aside from the observation count, each cell reports the proportion of all 68 respondents giving the response described in the row label. Private Return responses include good salary, good hours/location and most interesting opportunity. Social welfare responses includes "best opportunity to work on local development". *One individual responded that the bank was their first choice but did not provide a reason why, and another said they chose their job because it is "respected work". Mean Response (1=More, 0=Equal, Data are from survey administered 4 years post-random assignment, to all loan officers working for the two banks at the time, not just microloan officers. 17 of the 27 loan officers included in our experiment (see Tables 1 and 2) were still working for the banks at the time of this survey and hence are included in this sample. Each cell reports the mean response across all 68 respondents, while the index reports the mean of the above ten components, with components 4-10 multiplied by -1 such that they are all signed the same direction substantively. P-values in parentheses, clustered at the branch level. Table 2 Panel B for analogous result on poverty indices)
Each row reports regression-adjusted means (columns 1 and 2) and the treatment effect (column 3) estimated by regressing the outcome on the treatment indicator and strata (branch-pair) fixed effects. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the branch level and p-values {in brackets} are adjusted for our small number of clusters by using randomization inference with 5,000 permutations per Heb (2017). Variables here are used to construct the poverty indices in Table 2 Panel B (see the Appendix for details on index construction). .002} Number of microloan approvals over the 24-month study period 582 669 1251 Each row reports regression-adjusted means (columns 1 and 2), and the treatment effect (column 3) estimated by regressing the outcome on the treatment indicator and strata (branch-pair) fixed effects. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the branch level and p-values {in brackets} are adjusted for our small number of clusters by using randomization inference with 5,000 permutations per Heb (2017). Table 2 Panels A-C, which include all applicants) Appendix "Poverty Likelihood" measures the percent probability of a household being below the national poverty line.
(Compare to

